This article is the introductory chapter to a festschrift in honour of Geoff Hodgson. In work spanning four decades, Geoff Hodgson has made many path-breaking contributions to institutional economics, evolutionary economics, economic methodology, the history of economic thought and social theory more broadly.
formation of two international scholarly societies and the foundation of the Journal of Institutional Economics has expanded the opportunities for constructive dialogue among social scientists. 2 To celebrate Hodgon's fantastic career, this festschrift brings together 19 original contributions by world-leading scholars in specific areas that have played a significant role in influencing Hodgson's thinking or represent key debates to which he has contributed. The five chapters assembled in Part II discuss some of the philosophical and methodological aspects of Hodgson's work, and clarify the Veblenian foundations of his view of economic agents. Part III comprises seven chapters that position and engage with Hodgson's contributions to institutional economics, while Part IV includes seven chapters that situate and build on his contributions to evolutionary economics.
Inevitably, the division of chapters into parts is somewhat artificial. Not only do the themes discussed under the headings 'institutional economics' and 'evolutionary economics' intersect in various ways, but also the tradition that runs from Veblen to Hodgson has long defined itself as 'institutional and evolutionary economics' (or 'evolutionary and institutional economics'). In Part V, the concluding conversation with Hodgson covers some of the connections between the two fields. Hodgson is one of the most philosophically-minded economists writing today. Over the course of his career, he has gone to great lengths to clarify his philosophical and methodological positions. Part II opens with Sheila Dow's (Chapter 2) discussion of the links between Hodgson's ontological commitments and his epistemology. On the one hand, Hodgson believes that the absence of uniformity in socio-economic systems, located in historical time and geographical space, implies that economic explanations must rest on a combination of general and specific theories. This claim underpins his critique of excessive generalisation characteristic of the mainstream, but also his evaluation of Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes. On the other hand, Hodgson denies that the complexity of the subject matter, and the attendant impossibility of complete knowledge, justify the postmodernist credo that 'anything goes'. Instead, Hodgson believes that an open system ontology implies an open system of knowledge that allows for a variety of approaches, and underlines the value of the pragmatist method of abduction, namely the formulation of new explanatory hypotheses through the creative connection of alternative approaches. Dow shows that, contrary to Hodgson's assessment, both Smith and Keynes accepted this position.
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FESTSCHRIFT
Most economists today believe that mathematical models generate new explanatory hypotheses. Since most methodologists of mathematical modelling in economics also consider that models provide accounts of how real-world phenomena are produced, attention has mostly focused on how patently unrealistic models can nonetheless explain. Prevailing interpretations present models as counterfactual credible worlds or useful fairy tales that communicate important messages. The debate has also focused on whether the models' false assumptions do any of the explaining. In line with 4 Hodgson's view that further discussion and inquiry in this area is needed, Tony Lawson (Chapter 3) engages with these ideas, and defends the proposition that mathematical models in economics do not, and cannot, explain. Since models of this kind involve treating the open system that is social reality as a closed one, they do not merely simplify reality; they distort it. It is therefore hardly surprising, Lawson concludes, that models fail to provide insights into real-world causal relations.
Historians of economic thought have long noted the parallels between mathematical models of the economy and the mathematical models used in physics in the late nineteenth century. In his sweeping overview of the relationships between economics and the natural sciences, Philip Mirowski (Chapter 4) notes that much of the discussion has focused on methodological issues, such as potential explanatory isomorphisms, the uses of natural metaphors and the problem of scientism. But the connection between the two domains runs much deeper: it is epistemic and ontological.
All Western discussions of the economy since the fifteenth century have been imbued with notions of nature, and the two notions have been jointly defining one another for centuries. As a result, Mirowski argues, claims that economics underwent a process of denaturalization in the second half of the nineteenth century following breakdown of the theological conception of nature are incorrect. To fit the new physical conception of nature, economics was re-natured. Not only did appropriations from the natural sciences continue over the course of the twentieth century, but we have been living through yet another bout of re-naturing the economy with the rise of ecology in the recent past. While many economists were fascinated with the mathematical elegance of physics at the turn of the twentieth century, others, most notably Thorstein Veblen, turned to Darwinian evolutionary ideas. Veblen, as Charles Camic (Chapter 5) observes, 5 is commonly depicted as a marginal, socially-detached academic recluse, whose theoretical work was produced in isolation from his colleagues and students. This stereotype involves the separation of Veblen's teaching and service activities from his ideas, as if the latter developed, or could have developed, without the influence of the former. By contrast, Camic shows that Veblen was hardly an academic recluse, and that his various teaching and service responsibilities at the University of Chicago (1892) (1893) (1894) (1895) (1896) (1897) (1898) (1899) (1900) (1901) (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) contributed to the development of his ideas. Veblen's role as the managing editor of the Journal of Political Economy, his two terms on the Council of the American Economic Association, his work as a translator and his heavy involvement with teaching led him to interact on a practically daily basis with his professional colleagues and students around many of the very same issues he was writing about.
Veblen famously rejected the neoclassical view of the individual as a lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, and associated institutions with settled habits of thought and action. In line with his commitment to Veblenian thinking and agencystructure reasoning, Hodgson rejects the subjectivist conception of individuals as collections of preferences and views individuals in objectivist terms as distinguishable sets of habits that co-evolve with cumulative change in social structures and institutions.
John Davis (Chapter 6) draws on these ideas to propose an account of reflexive economic agents that explains choice behaviour in a cumulative causation world, in which both linear causation and circular feedback effects matter. Reflexive agents know that their actions can influence their habits and alter the basis for future action, and therefore form expectations about the consequences of their actions not only on the external world but also on themselves. But reflexive agents are reference-dependent and 6 biased toward the habits they already have, Davis argues, with the implication that they are not only distinguishable but also re-identifiable over time.
With the stage thus set, the discussion in Part III turns to positioning and Among Hodgson's several contributions to the theory of the firm, his insistence on the importance of the legal nature of the firm stands out. This is valuable, as Simon Deakin (Chapter 9) explains, because the study of the patterns of legal thought can reveal aspects of economic institutions that are otherwise hard to grasp. The concepts lawyers use to denote the firm in corporate law or employment law, for example, disclose something about its economic nature. But they also reveal something about the nature of law itself. The evolution of legal forms such as the corporation, Deakin argues, is the result of two conflicting pressures: on the one hand, the need to adjust the law to a changing external socio-economic environment, and on the other, the need to maintain the internal consistency of legal thought. Hence the gradual recognition of various forms of entity shielding and the assignment of legal personality to durable, self-governing associational arrangements was not only a historically-specific development associated with the long process of industrialisation. It was also driven by law's need to maintain internal, self-referential consistency, without which the legal system would dissolve into a mass of undifferentiated commands. Property rights can generate uncontested possession of rival goods but also artificially limit the potentially universal possession of non-rival goods. The latter aspect underpins 9 modern capitalism and the so-called knowledge economy, where intellectual property rights to knowledge can become an obstacle to economic development by limiting liberty and implying high transaction costs.
Hodgson has been concerned not only with key institutions of capitalism, including property, markets and firms, but also with the nature of capitalism itself. In recent work, he has specified a six-condition definition of capitalism. Relying on the income per capita statistics made available in recent years, Andrew Tylecote (Chapter 12) examines what causes the six conditions to appear and which constraining factors might prevent the sustained growth that is meant to follow. The history of two transformations into capitalism that did not quite make it is particularly instructive. The first is the case of the Low Countries, which by the mid-seventeenth century had met all six conditions, but nonetheless stagnated during the eighteenth century, contrary to Britain, where income per capita growth expanded rapidly once the conditions were met. The second is the case of Ming China, where growth failed to manifest despite being, by some estimates, close to economic take-off at around that time. The comparison reveals, Tylecote concludes, that the failure to build a unified home market can be fatal.
Overall, according to Giovanni Dosi, Luigi Marengo and Alessandro Nuvolari (Chapter 13), one finds two explanatory strategies in institutional economics: either institutions are derived from the choices of rational individuals with well-defined preferences, or preferences and indeed the very idea of rationality are derived from institutions. On the first view, institutions are crafted to perform coordinating and governance functions that enhance efficiency by mitigating contracting problems. On the latter view, institutions reproduce path-dependently in a partly self-organizing 10 process, irrespective of efficiency considerations. These differences translate into contrasting views of such key concepts as hierarchy, power, knowledge and learning in organizations. Given that each type of explanation contains a grain of truth, the challenge is to connect them. In line with empirical evidence regarding the influence of institutional arrangements on techno-economic change, Dosi, Marengo and Nuvolari call for an ambitious research program that addresses the co-evolution of organizations, forms of rationality, preferences and technologies.
The chapters comprising Part IV discuss some of the themes that run through schemes. Yet it remains empirically weak because the basic elements of an evolutionary approach -behaviours, habits, routines, technologies and institutions -are neither naturally nor easily quantitative, and unlike the market outcomes studied in the neoclassical framework, do not generate data in the process of their operations. Given its concern with qualitative phenomena, most notably the ideas, knowledge and generic rules that an economic order is made of, Dopfer and Potts argue, the principal methodological challenge facing evolutionary economics as a science requires the translation of theoretical constructs into empirical measures. This endeavour can be usefully organised around the micro-meso-macro analytical framework in which the basic empirical measures are the various dimensions of a meso unit: heterogeneity, variety, frequency. The generic taxonomy of orders, classes and phases of a rule provides the architecture for developing a comprehensive map of the measure space of an evolving economy.
The volume concludes, in Part V, with a conversation with Hodgson. The interviews we conducted (Chapter 21) cover many, but by no means all, of the important topics addressed by the other contributors. The conversation clarifies some of the main threads that run through Hodgson's work, and supplements many of the points made in preceding chapters. Among the topics addressed are the problems with the neoclassical utility maximization framework, the necessity to include moral motivations in a theory of human behaviour, and the requirement that such a theory be consistent with evidence from evolutionary biology and psychology. These considerations lead to a distinction between different kinds of, and reasons for, rule-following behaviour. The discussion moves on to address key aspects of Hodgson's methodology, and then turns to his assessment of the present position of heterodox economics. We close with an 15 overview of the strategy of the Journal of Institutional Economics and interdisciplinary institutional research more generally.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The chapters in this festschrift cover many of the important topics in economic methodology, institutional economics and evolutionary economics that Hodgson has contributed to. 3 Taken together, they also reveal key features of the 'Hodgson brand'.
These recognizable aspects of Hodgson's writing include his firm commitment to pluralism and interdisciplinarity, his capacity to integrate insights from the social sciences and the natural sciences, and his insistence that the constructive dialogue among researchers, both within and across disciplinary boundaries, is seriously impaired by the absence of linguistic precision and clear (taxonomic) definitions.
Incisive and comprehensive accounts of the history of the concepts he engages with, and the breadth of the literature thus covered, are also characteristic of Hodgson's work. Like many others, we have been profoundly influenced by Hodgson, and owe him a debt of gratitude. 4 It is an honour to count him as a mentor and a friend.
3 Given the breadth of Hodgson's contributions, it is hardly surprising that a number of themes that have mattered in his career are absent in this volume. The most important missing theme revolves around the place of Karl Marx in Hodgson's thought, and includes topics such as socialism, planning and utopia.
